Chapter 9 — Valuing Stocks
Equity vs. Debt
| Debt | Equity |
|---|---|
| Fixed payments | Variable dividends |
| Stated maturity | Infinite maturity |
| Subject to default risk | Residual claimant |
| Lower risk | Higher risk |
Three Valuation Approaches
| PV of… | Determines the… |
|---|---|
| Dividend Payments | Stock Price per share |
| Total Payouts (Divs + Repurchases) | Equity Value |
| Free Cash Flow | Enterprise Value |
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9.1 Stock Prices, Returns & the Investment Horizon
One-Period Timeline
Total Return
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9.2 Dividend-Discount Model
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9.3 Total Payout & Free Cash Flow Models
Total Payout Model
Discounted Free Cash Flow (DCF)
Model Comparison
| Model | Discounts | Best For | Rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| DDM | Dividends | Stable dividend payers | rE |
| Total Payout | Divs + buybacks | Repurchasing firms | rE |
| DCF | FCF | Any firm | rwacc |
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9.4 Valuation Based on Comparable Firms
Valuation Multiples
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9.5 Information, Competition & Stock Prices
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Chapter 10 — Capital Markets & the Pricing of Risk
96-Year Performance ($100 invested 1925 → 2021)
| Asset | Avg Return | Volatility | $100 grew to |
|---|---|---|---|
| Small Stocks | 18.6% | 38.6% | $93,939 |
| S&P 500 | 12.2% | 19.7% | $11,535 |
| Corp Bonds | 6.5% | 6.3% | $716 |
| T-Bills | 3.3% | 3.1% | $24 |
| Inflation (CPI) | — | — | $16 |
10.1 Risk & Return: 96 Years of History
The Growth of $100 (1925 → 2021)
The single most famous picture in investing: $100 invested in each asset class in 1925, plotted on a log scale (equal vertical distances = equal % growth). The ranking is dramatic.
Three Lessons From the Data
10.2 Common Measures of Risk and Return
| Economy | Probability | Return |
|---|---|---|
| Strong | 25% | +40% |
| Normal | 50% | +10% |
| Weak | 25% | −20% |
Picturing the Probability Distribution
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10.3 Historical Returns of Stocks and Bonds
10.4 Historical Risk-Return Tradeoff
| Portfolio | SD | Excess vs T-Bills |
|---|---|---|
| Small Stocks | 38.6% | 15.3% |
| S&P 500 | 19.7% | 8.9% |
| Corp Bonds | 6.3% | 3.2% |
| T-Bills | 3.1% | 0% |
Portfolios Line Up — Individual Stocks Don't
10.5 Common vs Independent Risk
| Type | Diversifiable? | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Independent | ✅ Yes | Fires, theft, firm news |
| Common | ❌ No | Recession, rates, pandemic |
10.6 Diversification in Stock Portfolios
How Volatility Falls as You Add Stocks
10.7 Measuring Systematic Risk: Beta (β)
| β | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | No systematic risk | Risk-free |
| 0–1 | Defensive (dampens) | Hormel 0.46, Coca-Cola 0.65 |
| 1 | Moves with market | S&P 500 |
| >1 | Cyclical (amplifies) | Apple 1.21, Tesla 1.66 |
Beta = Slope of the Best-Fit Line
10.8 Beta and the Cost of Capital — CAPM
The Security Market Line (SML)
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Chapter 11 — Optimal Portfolio Choice & the CAPM
The Storyline
Step 2: Diversification works because returns are imperfectly correlated.
Step 3: Plot all possible portfolios → identify the efficient frontier.
Step 4: Add a risk-free asset → the best portfolio is the tangent portfolio, measured by the Sharpe ratio.
Step 5: If everyone holds the tangent portfolio, it must equal the market portfolio. CAPM is born.
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11.1 The Expected Return of a Portfolio
Portfolio Weights
Portfolio Return
Worked Example
Total = $6,000 + $4,000 = $10,000. Weights: xDol = 60%, xCoke = 40%.
If E[RDol] = 10% and E[RCoke] = 7%:
E[RP] = 0.60(10%) + 0.40(7%) = 8.8%
11.2 The Volatility of a Two-Stock Portfolio
Covariance
Correlation (Standardized Covariance)
• +1 = perfectly positively correlated (move together)
• 0 = uncorrelated
• −1 = perfectly negatively correlated (perfect hedge)
Two-Stock Portfolio Variance
Example: Correlation Matters
• ρ = +1.0 → Portfolio SD = 20% (no benefit)
• ρ = 0.0 → Portfolio SD = 14.1%
• ρ = −1.0 → Portfolio SD = 0% (perfect hedge!)
Lower correlation → bigger diversification gain.
How Correlation Bends the Combination Curve
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11.3 Volatility of a Large Portfolio
Equally Weighted Portfolio of N Stocks
• First term → 0 (firm-specific risk vanishes)
• Second term → Average Covariance (systematic floor)
The portfolio's volatility cannot fall below the systematic risk built into the market.
Volatility vs Number of Stocks
What This Tells Us
11.4 Risk vs Return: Choosing an Efficient Portfolio
Definitions
Building the Frontier (Two-Stock Example)
11.5 Risk-Free Saving and Borrowing — The Tangent Portfolio
The Sharpe Ratio
Combining With Risk-Free
• E[Rcombo] = rf + y(E[RP] − rf)
• SD(Rcombo) = y × SD(RP)
→ A straight line from rf through P. Slope = Sharpe ratio of P. You want the steepest line.
The Tangent Portfolio
11.6 The Efficient Portfolio and Required Returns
Beta With Respect to a Portfolio P
Required Return on Asset i
Beta of a Portfolio
11.7 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
CAPM's Three Assumptions
| # | Assumption |
|---|---|
| 1 | Investors can buy/sell any security at competitive market prices (no taxes/fees) and borrow/lend at the risk-free rate. |
| 2 | Investors hold only efficient portfolios of risky assets — those that give max E[R] for a given SD. |
| 3 | Investors have homogeneous expectations: they agree on the volatilities, correlations, and expected returns. |
From Assumptions to the Market Portfolio
The CAPM Formula
The Capital Market Line (CML)
11.8 Determining the Risk Premium & the SML
The Security Market Line (SML)
• Intercept = rf
• Slope = Market Risk Premium = E[RMkt] − rf
Under CAPM, every fairly-priced asset plots on the SML. Above → underpriced (high return for its risk). Below → overpriced.
Beta of a Portfolio (Recap)
Summary of the CAPM
1. Only systematic risk (β) earns a premium.
2. The efficient portfolio = the market portfolio (under CAPM assumptions).
3. Every asset's required return lies on the SML.
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Chapter 12 — Estimating the Cost of Capital
The Three Inputs You Must Estimate
| Input | What it is | Where it comes from (Ch 12) |
|---|---|---|
| rf | Risk-free rate | §12.2 — a Treasury yield matched to the horizon |
| E[RMkt] − rf | Market risk premium | §12.2 — historical average or forward-looking DDM |
| βi | Stock's systematic-risk loading | §12.3 — linear regression of excess returns |
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12.1 The Equity Cost of Capital
Why a Cost of Capital Exists at All
When a firm invests, its shareholders give up the chance to invest that money elsewhere. The return they sacrifice on an equally-risky alternative is the project's opportunity cost of capital. If the project can't beat that alternative, shareholders are worse off — so it becomes the hurdle rate (the discount rate) for the project's cash flows.
The CAPM Equation (the Security Market Line)
E[RMkt] − rf — market risk premium
βi — sensitivity to the market
MRP is the price of one unit of market risk
β is how many units of that risk you bear
The Security Market Line, Drawn
Worked Example — Disney's Equity Cost of Capital
Step 1 — risk premium for Disney: β × MRP = 1.29 × 5% = 6.45%
Step 2 — add the risk-free floor: 3% + 6.45% = 9.45%
So Disney's equity cost of capital is 9.45%. This is the discount rate for Disney's equity cash flows — and for any new Disney project with the same business risk as the firm overall.
Why Beta — and Not Total Volatility?
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12.2 The Market Portfolio
Constructing the Market Portfolio
In theory the market portfolio holds every risky asset. Each security appears in proportion to its share of total market value:
Worked Example — A 3-Stock Value-Weighted Portfolio
| Stock | Price | Shares | Market Cap | Weight |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| General Electric | $30 | 2 M | $60 M | 50% |
| Home Depot | $20 | 1.5 M | $30 M | 25% |
| Cisco | $10 | 3 M | $30 M | 25% |
| Total | $120 M | 100% |
Three Weighting Schemes — Don't Confuse Them
Market Indexes & Proxies
Holding every risky asset on Earth is impossible, so we use a market proxy:
| Index | Covers | Weighting | Good proxy? |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P 500 | 500 largest US stocks | Value-weighted | ✅ Standard for CAPM |
| Wilshire 5000 | ~entire US market | Value-weighted | ✅ Most complete |
| Dow Jones (DJIA) | Only 30 stocks | Price-weighted | ❌ Poor proxy |
| ETFs (SPY, VTI) | Track an index 1:1 | Inherit the index | ✅ Cheap "buy the market" |
The Market Risk Premium (MRP)
This is the reward for bearing one unit of market risk — the slope of the SML. Estimating it well matters as much as estimating β.
Choosing the Risk-Free Rate
• short projects (≈1 yr) → T-bill yields
• long projects (5–30 yr) → Treasury bond yields (most common in capital budgeting)
• some firms average the two.
Approach 1 — Historical Average
Average the market's realized excess return over the risk-free rate. The horizon you pick changes the number:
| Period | Excess vs 1-yr T-bills | Excess vs 10-yr T-bonds |
|---|---|---|
| 1926–2015 | 7.7% | 5.9% |
| 1965–2015 | 5.0% | 3.9% |
Approach 2 — Fundamental (Dividend-Discount) Method
12.3 Beta Estimation
Step 1 — Do the Returns Move Together?
Before computing anything, look at the data. Plotting Callaway Golf's weekly returns against the S&P 500 (2017–2021) shows they move in the same direction — but Callaway swings far more (its weekly SD ≈ 51% vs the S&P's ≈ 19%). That extra amplitude is exactly what β captures.
Step 2 — Fit the Best Line (Linear Regression)
Plot each week's excess returns (return − rf) of the stock against the market's, and fit the line that minimises the squared distances to the points:
Interpreting β
| β | Reading | Examples |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | No systematic risk | T-bills (~0) |
| 0 < β < 1 | Defensive — dampens market swings | Utilities, food, healthcare |
| 1 | Moves one-for-one with market | The market portfolio |
| > 1 | Aggressive / cyclical | Tech, autos, banks, small-caps |
| < 0 | Moves opposite the market (rare) | Some gold miners; hedges |
How Much Does β Explain? — R²
Practical Caveats
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Chapter 13 — Investor Behavior & Capital Market Efficiency
The Logical Chain of This Chapter
| § | Question | Answer |
|---|---|---|
| 13.1 | What does an efficient market imply? | Every stock's α = 0; competition enforces it |
| 13.2 | Can ordinary investors beat it? | Only with unique info + low costs — so be passive |
| 13.3 | What do real investors actually do? | Under-diversify & over-trade — hurting returns |
| 13.4 | Do their mistakes break the CAPM? | Only if the biases are systematic |
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13.1 Competition and Capital Markets
Where This Chapter Sits
In Chapter 11 we derived the CAPM from the assumption that all investors hold efficient portfolios with homogeneous (identical) beliefs. That gave us a clean conclusion: the market portfolio is efficient and every stock plots on the Security Market Line. But that derivation rested on strong assumptions. Chapter 13 asks the realistic follow-up: what if investors don't behave that way? Do real investors actually drive prices to the CAPM ideal — and if not, can anyone profit from the gap? This first section sets up the analytical tool we need for the whole chapter: the alpha of a stock.
The Market Portfolio May Not Be Efficient
If the average investor does not hold the true market portfolio, the market portfolio need not lie on the efficient frontier — there could be another portfolio with the same volatility but a higher expected return. This is the situation drawn in the textbook's Figure 13.1 ("An Inefficient Market Portfolio"): the market sits inside the frontier, not on it.
Defining Alpha
Recall the CAPM "required return" for stock i: the return justified by its systematic risk, ri = rf + βi(E[RMkt] − rf). The alpha is the difference between the return investors actually expect the stock to earn and this required return — i.e. its vertical distance from the Security Market Line:
Profiting from Non-Zero Alpha Stocks
Suppose you currently hold the market portfolio and you spot a stock with positive alpha. You can improve your portfolio's risk-return trade-off: buy more of the positive-alpha stock (and finance it by selling a bit of negative-alpha stocks, or by reducing your market holding). Because the positive-alpha stock offers more return than its beta requires, this tilt raises your expected return without a proportionate rise in risk. Every investor who notices the same opportunity does the same thing.
Trading on News or Recommendations
A natural question: "if a stock has a positive alpha, why can't I just buy it and profit?" The catch is timing. By the time public news or an analyst recommendation reaches you, thousands of other investors have already received it and traded — pushing the price up and competing the alpha away before you can act. To profit you would need information that is not already reflected in the price, which leads directly into §13.2.
Worked Example
• Green Leaf: E[R] = 12%, β = 1.50 → CAPM = 4 + 1.50×5 = 11.5% → α = 12 − 11.5 = +0.5% (buy)
• Hand-Mover: E[R] = 7%, β = 0.85 → CAPM = 4 + 0.85×5 = 8.25% → α = 7 − 8.25 = −1.25% (sell)
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13.2 Information and Rational Expectations
The Setup: Who Trades Against Whom?
The CAPM was derived assuming homogeneous expectations — every investor agrees on every stock's expected return, volatility, and correlations. Reality is different: investors hold different information and interpret it differently. To analyse this we split the market into two groups.
The Crucial Asymmetry
Trading is a zero-sum game in gross terms: for every investor who buys a stock that subsequently outperforms, there is a counterparty on the other side who sold it and underperformed. So whenever an informed investor earns a positive alpha by exploiting their information, someone must be earning a negative alpha as the loser of that trade. The losers are, on average, the uninformed.
Rational Expectations
The textbook resolves this with the assumption of rational expectations: all investors correctly interpret and use the information contained in market prices, and they understand their own informational position. A rational uninformed investor reasons: "I have no edge. If I trade actively I will lose to the informed and pay costs. The one portfolio whose alpha I can be sure is zero is the market portfolio itself."
Example 13.1 — Avoiding Being Outsmarted
When Can the Uninformed Beat the Market?
1. You possess information that other investors do not have (a genuine, non-public edge).
2. That information is valuable enough to overcome transaction costs — commissions, bid-ask spreads, price impact, and taxes.
For the overwhelming majority of individual investors, neither condition is met — so the rational choice is passive, low-cost indexing.
Active Trading Is Negative-Sum After Costs
Aggregate over all investors: the gross alphas must sum to zero (every trade has two sides). Therefore the average actively-managed dollar earns the market return before costs and the market return minus costs after them. Active management as a whole is a negative-sum game; passive index funds avoid the drag entirely. This is the core practical takeaway of the section.
13.3 The Behavior of Individual Investors
1 — Under-Diversification
One of the most important results of Chapters 10–11 is that diversification reduces risk at no cost to expected return. Yet the evidence is striking: the typical individual investor is severely under-diversified. Studies of brokerage accounts find the median household holds only 3–4 individual stocks, and a large fraction hold just one or two. Three distinct behavioral explanations are offered.
Familiarity Bias
Relative Wealth Concerns
2 — Excessive Trading & Overconfidence
Even setting diversification aside, individuals trade far too much. The overconfidence hypothesis explains why: people systematically overestimate their own ability to pick winners and the precision of their information. Believing they have an edge they don't actually have, they trade aggressively — and every trade incurs commissions, bid-ask spreads, and (for winners) taxes.
The textbook's Figure 13.3 shows U.S. stock-market annual share turnover climbing over 1970–2021 — investors collectively churn their portfolios many times over. Barber & Odean's landmark study of tens of thousands of brokerage accounts produced two now-classic findings:
- The more an investor traded, the worse they did. Sorting investors into turnover groups, the lowest-turnover group roughly matched the market (~17–18%/yr) while the highest-turnover group earned only ~7%/yr — after costs (Figure 13.4 below).
- Men trade ~45% more than women and, consistent with overconfidence, underperform them — single men are the worst of all.
Sensation Seeking
3 — From Individual Behavior to Market Prices
Here is the key analytical point of the section. We have established that individuals make real mistakes (under-diversifying, over-trading). Does this mean the CAPM is wrong and prices are inefficient? Not necessarily — it depends entirely on whether the mistakes are correlated across investors.
• If individual departures from the CAPM are random and uncorrelated — some investors over-buy a stock while others over-sell it — the mistakes cancel out in aggregate. The average investor still effectively holds the market portfolio, so prices remain efficient and the CAPM still describes them. The mistaken individuals hurt only themselves.
• If the departures are systematic — many investors making the same error in the same direction at the same time — the mistakes do not cancel. Aggregate demand is distorted, prices can be pushed away from fundamental value, and the CAPM can fail.
13.4 Systematic Trading Biases
1 — The Disposition Effect (Hanging On to Losers)
The single most documented systematic bias. Investors have a strong tendency to hold on to stocks that have lost value and sell stocks that have risen — the opposite of what a rational, tax-aware investor should do. Shefrin and Statman named this the disposition effect.
• Tax: in most tax systems you should defer gains (defer the tax) and realise losses early (harvest the deduction). The disposition effect does the exact opposite — it accelerates the tax bill and forgoes the loss deduction.
• Capital allocation: it traps money in chronically under-performing stocks.
This bias is systematic — it pushes most investors the same way — so it is a candidate for actually affecting prices (it contributes to short-term return "momentum").
2 — Investor Attention, Mood & Experience
3 — Herd Behavior
Investors make similar trading mistakes because they are actively imitating each other rather than acting on their own analysis. Two distinct mechanisms:
Implications of Behavioral Biases
Putting it together: behavioral biases can move prices, but only under specific conditions, and even then exploiting them is hard.
📐 Formulas — Chapter 13
Market portfolio efficient ⇔ αi = 0 for every stock i.
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